WANG Zongrun, NI Xuekai, REN Xiaohang
When a sudden public health emergency occurs, the demand for emergency medical supplies surges, and ensuring the effective supply of emergency medical materials becomes a crucial issue concerning public safety. To investigate the strategic choices among emergency medical supplies stakeholders during sudden public health emergencies, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving medical material suppliers, hospitals, and local governments. Based on the real-world scenario during the COVID-19 pandemic where some medical material suppliers engaged in speculative sales, disrupting market order, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving medical material suppliers, hospitals, and local governments. It analyzes the stability of strategies adopted by each stakeholder in the game and further employs the Lyapunov first law to analyze the stability of combined strategies in the game system. Subsequently, simulation analysis is conducted to discuss the influence of different parameters on the evolution of the tripartite game system. The research indicates that evolutionarily stable strategies are significantly influenced by hospital complaint costs and the strict supervision costs imposed by local governments. Excessively high hospital complaint costs can result in insufficient proactive supervision feedback from hospitals, consequently leading to ineffective strict government supervision, especially given the relatively high costs associated with such supervision. Ultimately, the strategic choices of the three parties in the game tend towards speculative sales, acceptance, loose supervision. The intensity of rewards and penalties implemented by local governments on the decision-making entities of the other two parties plays a decisive role in the stability of the system. Insufficient rewards and penalties by local governments on medical material suppliers or inadequate compensation by hospitals, coupled with excessive punishment, can lead to the failure of strict government supervision. When local governments adopt a lax supervisory stance, emergency medical material suppliers naturally lean towards speculative sales. To ensure the effective supply of emergency medical supplies, local governments must consistently enforce strict supervision.