WANG Xiangyu, LI Keqiang, SUN Ting, TIAN Qiong, LIU Peng, WANG Pengfei
Focusing on the supply side of vehicle charging service, this study proposes two differential game models for charging pile operation decision-making, with the government, operator, and third-party platform (hereinafter referred to as the platform) as the participants. The two differential game models are decentralized (i.e., operators and platforms aim to maximize their own interests) and centralized (i.e., operators and platforms aim to maximize the overall interests of both). The results show that under the equilibrium state with fixed revenue distribution ratios between operator and platform, compared with the decentralized decision-making mode, the centralized decision-making mode can improve the efforts of operator and platform, service quality and social benefit. When the platform is relatively weak and has a lower share of revenue, adopting the centralized decision-making mode can achieve a Pareto improvement in the revenues of both operator and platform; conversely, when the platform is relatively strong and has a higher share of revenue, adopting the decentralized decision-making mode can increase the revenues of both operator and platform. This indicates that as platform develops from weak to strong, the decision-making mode of the charging service market may shift from centralized to decentralized. At this time, the proportion of government policy support will increase, and social benefit and service quality may decrease.