LIU Aijun, XIONG Jiamin, CHAI Jian, LI Zengxian, LI Jiaxin, ZHANG Yan
While the franchise-based express delivery industry has developed rapidly, there are also issues of unstable cooperation caused by conflicting interests and low service quality, which makes it difficult to satisfy the increasing demand for high-quality and high-service from consumers. To this end, this paper uses the method of evolutionary game to dynamically analyze the evolutionary stability of the courier company's regulatory strategy, the production behavior of terminal franchisees and the government's regulatory rewards and punishments strategy, and reveals the impact of different decision parameters on evolutionary stability, demonstrating the conditions for evolutionary stability. The numerical analysis results indicate that when the risk cost and profit-sharing ratio are in different threshold intervals, the game system between express delivery companies and franchisees presents four different evolutionary stability results. In addition, when formulating reward and punishment policies, the government should ensure that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is greater than their speculative gains, in order to ensure the standardized operation and cooperative stability of express service enterprises. The results of this paper are of great significance to the establishment of a suitable default punishment system, risk identification and early warning mechanisms, and enhancing the government's regulatory functions, while creating a favorable market operating environment.
