SUN Jiayi, HAN Yujie, YAO Fengmin
Based on Nash non-cooperative game theory and variational inequality theory, this paper constructs a supply chain network equilibrium model under the combination of historical emission method and industry benchmark method, aiming at the production decision of different carbon emission manufacturers under different carbon quota allocation strategies. By comparing the effects of single carbon policy and complex carbon policy on supply chain network equilibrium, the implementation conditions of the optimal carbon quota allocation policy are proposed and its effect is verified. Secondly, it expands the supply chain network equilibrium model in which the government is a participant, and reveals the double leverage effect of the linkage between carbon quota allocation ratio and carbon price when the government is an endogenous player, which provides a quantitative decision-making tool for the design of “precise carbon control” policy. Finally, the model is simulated by projection shrinkage algorithm. The conclusion is as follows: Under the historical emission method, compared with expanding production scale, the two manufacturers with different carbon emissions are more inclined to achieve the optimal profit through carbon quota trading, while retailers are faced with the risk of profit compression. Under the industry benchmark method, when the unit carbon quota is greater than the unit carbon emission, the profit advantage of the emission reduction manufacturer over the ordinary manufacturer will gradually decrease with the increase of the carbon trading price; when the unit carbon quota is less than the unit carbon emission, the profit of the two types of manufacturers will decrease with the increase of the carbon trading price, and the profit of the retailer is generally stable in both cases. Under the composite carbon quota policy, when the unit carbon quota is greater than the unit carbon emission, the industry benchmark method accounts for a large proportion, and the profits and social welfare of the two types of manufacturers are the best, but the profit growth rate of the ordinary manufacturers is higher than that of the emission reduction manufacturers. When the unit carbon quota is smaller than the unit carbon emission, the larger proportion of historical emission method is more advantageous to the profits and social welfare of the two types of manufacturers. The profit of retailers gradually decreases with the increase of the proportion of historical emission method. After the government is included in the decision-making body, the increase in carbon price significantly increased the income of emission reduction manufacturers through cap-and-surplus trading, while ordinary manufacturers could only pass on the cost due to technology locking, resulting in a negative imbalance in social welfare. This study provides theoretical support and decision-making basis for the government's carbon quota allocation policy and supply chain network response strategy.
