REN Tinghai, LI Yuhao, WANG Dafei, ZENG Nengmin
This study considers a data service supply chain “DSSC” consisting of a data provider, a data service provider, and users. Based on the unique characteristics of data such as infinite replicability and copyability and users' demand for data timeliness, we construct two profit decision game models: Pricing based on data timeliness “PB-DT” and pricing based on usage frequency “PB-UF”. By constructing profit decision game models based on two data asset pricing models, this study investigates the technology investment decisions of DSSC members, data asset pricing methods, and data asset and data service pricing decisions. Firstly, the study finds that under both pricing models, the decisions of DSSC members do not affect the sales volume of data services. Furthermore, the sales volume of data services under the PB-DT pricing model is greater than that under the PB-UF pricing model. However, this does not necessarily mean that the profits of DSSC members and user utility are greater under the PB-DT pricing model than under the PB-UF pricing model. Secondly, the study finds that the data supplier's choice of pricing method for data assets is solely related to the data service provider's valuation of the data's timeliness. For example, when the data service provider's valuation of the data asset is low (or high), the data supplier chooses the PB-UF (or PB-DT) pricing method. Finally, the study finds that the data pricing method actually chosen by the data supplier may be “consistent” with or “contradictory” to the data pricing method expected by the data service provider and users. Especially, when the DSSC members have consistent preferences regarding the data asset pricing method, the synergistic effects among DSSC members are maximized, and the DSSC performance can reach a Pareto optimal state.
