HE Zheng, ZHANG Tongjing, YANG Xiaohong
In the platform ecosystem, platform enterprises and complementary enterprises work together to improve the efficiency of value co-creation. Because the level of effort of both sides can not be completely observed by each other, it will lead to bilateral moral hazard. Therefore, considering the factors such as platform governance ability, the external effect of the network, the embedding degree of the relationship, fairness preference, risk preference and so on, a multi-task principal-agent model is constructed, which is composed of platform enterprises and complementary enterprises under favorable and unfair conditions. The formal contract to maximize the value of both parties is explored. And the effects of various factors on the optimal effort level of the complementary enterprise, the optimal effort level of the platform enterprise to improve governance ability and the optimal income sharing ratio are analyzed. The conclusions of the study are as follows: The synergistic value, the degree of relationship embedding, and the enhancement of the pride intensity of complementary enterprises brought about by external network effects will increase the optimal effort level and optimal profit sharing ratio of complementary enterprises, while the enhancement of sympathy and jealousy intensity of complementary enterprises will reduce their optimal effort level and optimal profit sharing ratio. The research can help solve the bilateral moral hazard problem that arises between platform enterprises and complementary enterprises, reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry on the platform ecosystem, and thus improve the operational efficiency of the entire platform ecosystem.
