MA Jingjing, ZHANG Weiwei, JIANG Wanqi, WU Jun
Accepted: 2026-03-12
Against the backdrop of global population aging and the high prevalence of chronic diseases, Formula Foods for Special Medical Purposes (FSMP) serve as critical clinical nutrition intervention vehicles. However, their development face significant challenges including information asymmetry, heightened quality-safety risks, and insufficient corporate social responsibility (CSR) fulfillment, leading to elevated regulatory costs, inefficient stakeholder coordination, and weak market trust foundations. To explore effective pathways for resolving this governance dilemma, this paper constructs a two-stage evolutionary game model consisting of a two-player game between manufacturers and consumers and a tripartite game involving industry associations, manufacturers, and consumers. The study finds that in the market-driven two-player game, the system tends to converge on the inefficient evolutionary stable equilibrium of “non-fulfillment-non-purchase.” The high cost of CSR compliance for manufacturers, insufficient consumer perception of the health utility of FSMP, and significant information asymmetry among stakeholders are the core causes of industry trust barriers and the overall lack of motivation for CSR fulfillment across the industry. In the tripartite game incorporating industry association-led science communication interventions, the strategy combination of “association science communication-manufacturer CSR fulfillment-consumer purchase” is the sole ideal equilibrium with strong stability. This strategy combination can form a positive value cycle through the mutual empowerment of multi-stakeholder behaviors. Numerical simulation results show that core cost and benefit parameters exhibit chain transmission effects on system evolution, and each parameter has a clear critical threshold. The cost of association science communication and the consumer subsidy threshold mutually constrain each other; the social reputation effect for manufacturers and the negative social effect threshold of non-fulfillment form a mutually reinforcing complementary relationship; the price threshold for FSMP on the consumer side is positively empowered by the former two factors. The initial strategic participation willingness of agents significantly moderates the effective range of parameter thresholds. High initial willingness can broaden the reasonable regulatory range of parameters and reduce the sensitivity of system evolution, while low initial willingness compresses the threshold range, causing even slight parameter deviations to trigger system degradation toward the inefficient equilibrium. In summary, the science communication effect serves as the core lever for resolving the governance dilemma in the FSMP industry. It effectively reduces market information asymmetry, enhances consumer trust in FSMP, and lays the cognitive foundation for multi-stakeholder collaboration. To achieve multi-stakeholder incentive alignment in CSR fulfillment within the FSMP industry, it is necessary to construct a systematic governance system from the synergistic perspective of government, market, and enterprises. Industry associations should take the lead in building a platform for co-construction and sharing of science communication resources, establishing dynamic adjustment mechanisms for science communication cost-sharing and consumer subsidies to improve the implementation efficiency of science communication and subsidies. Manufacturers need to deeply integrate with the association’s science communication system, transform reputational capital into actual market premiums, and internalize the negative social effects of non-fulfillment through transparent communication mechanisms. Consumers should leverage the information disclosure by associations to form rational perceptions of FSMP, reduce purchase costs through community bargaining, and generate positive market feedback through proactive purchasing decisions. The coordinated efforts of the three parties are essential to fostering a multi-stakeholder collaborative positive cycle characterized by “science communication boosting trust-fulfillment improving quality-demand expanding,” thereby achieving the synergistic optimization of social and economic benefits in the FSMP industry