WANG Ziming, ZHOU Baohuan, TAO Tao, LIANG Liang
Accepted: 2025-09-10
Ensuring vaccine safety remains a global public health priority, particularly given recent scandals highlighting the vulnerabilities of traditional vaccine supply chains, including opaque information flows and risks of data tampering. As an emerging technological solution, blockchain offers features such as decentralization, immutability, and traceability, which are highly relevant to enhancing vaccine supply chain transparency and reliability. This paper develops a theoretical model of a two-tier vaccine supply chain, comprising one vaccine manufacturer and two symmetric inoculation units, to explore the strategic impact of blockchain adoption, referred to as “on-chaining”, on supply chain participants’ pricing and participation decisions under competitive conditions. The results demonstrate that on-chaining enhances consumers’ trust in the safety and quality of vaccines, which in turn increases demand for vaccines provided by participating inoculation units. Consequently, both wholesale and retail prices tend to rise following blockchain adoption. However, the effects on each supply chain member’ s profit are asymmetric and highly sensitive to several contextual factors, including the proportion of qualified vaccines, market potential, vaccine production costs, and competitive intensity between inoculation units. Notably, while on-chaining leads to greater transparency, it can impose additional costs on inoculation units due to the need to discard unqualified vaccines, potentially reducing their profits. Meanwhile, non-adopting units may benefit from positive externalities created by their competitors’ on-chaining, thereby weakening the competitive advantage of early adopters. This article provides theoretical support for the practical application of blockchain technology in the vaccine supply chain, and provides useful reference for technology adoption and pricing decisions of supply chain members.