HE Qi-long, LIAN Zheng, LUO Xing, GAO Hui-qing, Wang Xian-jia
Accepted: 2026-01-16
Consolidating and expanding the achievements of poverty alleviation is the cornerstone of comprehensively advancing rural vitalization, while promoting the sustainable development of industrial assistance is the key to consolidating this cornerstone. At present, the widely adopted ”fixed-income” interest linkage mechanism in practice has a clear deviation from the ”equity-participation dividend” mechanism advocated by national policies. To this end, this paper takes asset-income-based industrial assistance as the research object, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving local governments, business entities and poverty-alleviated households, and uses numerical simulation to analyze the impact of different parameters on the strategic evolution and system equilibrium of the three parties, so as to reveal the logic behind the choice of interest linkage mechanism in reality.The research shows that: (1) Against the background of poverty-alleviated households’ risk aversion, poor investment environment and declining interest rate level, local governments weigh between performance assessment and investment risks, and business entities focus on the goal of driving poverty-alleviated households to achieve comprehensive benefits. After a comprehensive assessment of their own net benefits, the three parties’ strategies evolve to a stable state where local governments implement strict regulatory measures, business entities actively drive poverty-alleviated households to increase income, and poverty-alleviated households choose the ”fixed-income” mode. (2) Suffcient policy and reputation benefits are the necessary conditions for local governments to implement strict regulation. (3) Increasing fiscal incentives and reducing the costs and risks of rural industrial projects can significantly enhance business entities’ willingness to actively drive poverty-alleviated households. (4) The higher the additional benefits of business entities and the lower the profit distribution ratio, the stronger the willingness of poverty-alleviated households to choose the equity-participation dividend mechanism.From the perspective of dynamic evolution, this paper reveals the formation mechanism of the deviation between policy advocacy and realistic preference, provides a theoretical explanation for understanding the universality of the ”fixed-income” interest linkage mechanism, and offers references for optimizing the asset-income-based industrial assistance model.