Research on Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies Considering Government Subsidies and Manufacturers' Reciprocal Preferences

Wang Daoping, Yin Yibo, Dong Hanxi

Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences ›› 2023, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (8) : 2064-2085.

PDF(817 KB)
PDF(817 KB)
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences ›› 2023, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (8) : 2064-2085. DOI: 10.12341/jssms22315

Research on Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies Considering Government Subsidies and Manufacturers' Reciprocal Preferences

  • Wang Daoping, Yin Yibo, Dong Hanxi
Author information +
History +

Abstract

In order to study the long-term impact of government subsidies and manufacturers' reciprocal preference behavior on carbon emission reduction supply chain operations, this paper constructs a non-reciprocal preference for manufacturers without government subsidies on the basis of considering the dynamic impact of product carbon emission reduction levels on consumer demand. There are five differential game models, namely the non-reciprocal preference model for manufacturers with government subsidies, the reciprocal preference model for manufacturers without government subsidies, the reciprocal preference model for manufacturers with government subsidies, and the centralized mode. Carbon emission reductions are used as state variables to solve the optimal trajectory of supply chain emission reduction, comparing the carbon emission reduction levels of manufacturers and suppliers and the government's subsidy coefficient under different models, and using centralized decision-making as a benchmark to explore the impact of government subsidies and manufacturers' reciprocal preference behavior on supply chain carbon emission reduction levels and profits. Research shows that the reciprocal preference behavior of manufacturers will not only improve the profits of the manufacturers themselves, but also the profits of upstream suppliers. Government subsidies to supply chain members can improve the level of carbon emission reduction and profits in the supply chain, but government subsidies will weaken the reciprocal preference behavior of manufacturers.

Key words

Government subsidy / carbon emission reduction / reciprocal preference / differential game

Cite this article

Download Citations
Wang Daoping , Yin Yibo , Dong Hanxi. Research on Carbon Emission Reduction Strategies Considering Government Subsidies and Manufacturers' Reciprocal Preferences. Journal of System Science and Mathematical Science Chinese Series, 2023, 43(8): 2064-2085 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms22315

References

[1] 王文利, 程天毓. 碳交易背景下供应链运营决策的演化博弈分析. 系统工程理论与实践, 2021, 41(5):1272- 1281. (Wang W L, Cheng T Y. Evolutionary game analysis of supply chain operation decision-making in the context of carbon trading. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2021, 41(5):1272- 1281.)
[2] Benjaafar S, Li Y, Daskin M. Carbon footprint and the management of supply chains:Insights from simple models. IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering, 2013, 10(1):99-116.
[3] 张桂涛, 王广钦, 赵欣语. 碳配额交易体系下闭环供应链网络的生产与碳交易策略研究. 中国管理科学, 2021, 195(1):97-108. (Zhang G T, Wang G Q, Zhao X Y. Research on production and carbon trading strategy of closedloop supply chain network under carbon quota trading system. China Management Science, 2021, 195(1):97-108.)
[4] 张令荣, 王健, 彭博. 内外部碳配额交易路径下供应链减排决策研究. 中国管理科学, 2020, 193(11):145- 154. (Zhang L R, Wang J, Peng B. Research on supply chain emission reduction decision-making under the internal and external carbon quota trading path. China Management Science, 2020, 193(11):145-154.)
[5] Toptal A, Ozlu H, Konur D. Joint decisions on inventory replenishment and emission reduction investment under different emission regulations. International Journal of Production Research, 2014, 52(1):243-269.
[6] 张李浩, 董款, 张荣. 基于碳配额交易和减排技术的供应链策略选择. 中国管理科学, 2019, 171(1):63-72. (Zhang L H, Dong K, Zhang R. Supply chain strategy selection based on carbon quota trading and emission reduction technology. China Management Science, 2019, 171(1):63-72.)
[7] 李友东, 谢鑫鹏, 王锋正. 考虑碳配额和交易的排放依赖型供应链低碳化运营决策. 控制与决策, 2020, 35(9):2236-2244. (Li Y D, Xie X P, Wang F Z. Emission dependent supply chain low-carbon operation decision considering carbon quota and trading. Control and Decision, 2020, 35(9):2236-2244.)
[8] 龚晨, 毕克新. 低碳情境下制造企业社会责任对创新绩效的影响研究. 预测, 2018, 220(1):43-48. (Gong C, Bi K X. Research on the impact of manufacturing corporate social responsibility on innovation performance under low carbon situation. Forecast, 2018, 220(1):43-48.)
[9] 唐书传, 刘云志, 肖条军. 考虑社会责任的供应链定价与碳减排决策. 中国管理科学, 2020, 186(4):99-108. (Tang S C, Liu Y Z, Xiao T J. Supply chain pricing and carbon emission reduction decisions considering social responsibility. China Management Science, 2020, 186(4):99-108.)
[10] 林欢, 马骋, 孙琦. 企业社会责任下碳减排优化策略与协调机制研究. 运筹与管理, 2021, 178(1):29-35. (Lin H, Ma C, Sun Q. Research on carbon emission reduction optimization strategy and coordination mechanism under corporate social responsibility. Operation Research and Management, 2021, 178(1):29-35.)
[11] 王文隆, 王福乐, 张涑贤. 考虑低碳努力的双渠道供应链协调契约研究. 管理评论, 2021, 33(4):315-326. (Wang W L, Wang F L, Zhang S X. Research on the two-channel supply chain coordination contract considering low-carbon efforts. Management Review, 2021, 33(4):315-326.)
[12] 夏良杰, 柳慧, 张萌, 等. 强制减排规制下基于碳减排利润增量分享契约的供应链协调研究. 运筹与管理, 2019, 158(5):92-98, 107. (Xia L J, Liu H, Zhang M, et al. Research on supply chain coordination based on carbon emission reduction profit increment sharing contract under mandatory emission reduction regulations. Operation Research and Management, 2019, 158(5):92-98, 107.)
[13] 潘永明, 邹丁华, 张志武. 基于碳标签制度的两级供应链协调机制研究. 中国管理科学, 2021, 195(1):109- 115. (Pan Y M, Zou D H, Zhang Z W. Research on two-level supply chain coordination mechanism based on carbon label system. China Management Science, 2021, 195(1):109-115.)
[14] Ma W M, Zhao Z, Ke H. Dual channel closed loop supply chain with government consumption subsidy. European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 226(2):221-227.
[15] Cohen M C, Lobel R, Perakis G. The impact of demand uncertainty on consumer subsidies for green technology adoption. Management Science, 2016, 62(5):1235-1258.
[16] 卢超, 程海芳, 蔡建湖. 同侪激励机制下政府补贴对制造商绿色研发影响的演化博弈分析. 管理学报, 2022, 184(1):93-101. (Lu C, Cheng H F, Cai J H. Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of government subsidies on manufacturers' green R&D under the peer incentive mechanism. Journal of Management, 2022, 184(1):93-101.)
[17] 王道平, 王婷婷, 张博卿. 基于微分博弈的供应链合作减排和政府补贴策略. 控制与决策, 2019, 34(8):1733-1744. (Wang D P, Wang T T, Zhang B Q. Supply chain cooperative emission reduction and government subsidy strategy based on differential game. Control and Decision, 2019, 34(8):1733-1744.)
[18] 徐春秋, 王芹鹏. 考虑政府参与方式的供应链低碳商誉微分博弈模型. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(8):35-44. (Xu C Q, Wang Q P. Supply chain low-carbon goodwill differential game model considering government participation. Operations Research and Management, 2020, 29(8):35-44.)
[19] 王道平, 王婷婷. 政府奖惩下供应链合作减排与低碳宣传的动态优化. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(4):113-120. (Wang D P, Wang T T. Dynamic optimization of supply chain cooperation, emission reduction and low-carbon publicity under government incentives and punishment. Operations Research and Management, 2020, 29(4):113-120.)
[20] 赵道致, 原白云, 徐春明. 低碳供应链纵向合作减排的动态优化. 控制与决策, 2014, 29(7):1340-1344. (Zhao D Z, Yuan B Y, Xu C M. Dynamic optimization of low-carbon supply chain vertical cooperation and emission reduction. Control and Decision, 2014, 29(7):1340-1344.)
[21] 王文宾, 丁军飞, 王智慧. 回收责任分担视角下零售商主导闭环供应链的政府奖惩机制研究. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(7):127-136. (Wang W B, Ding J F, Wang Z H. Research on the government reward and punishment mechanism of retailers leading closed-loop supply chain from the perspective of recycling responsibility sharing. China Management Science, 2019, 27(7):127-136.)
[22] 张盼, 余莉婷, 熊中楷. 政府奖惩下闭环供应链中信息不对称时的最优合同设计. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(5):89-100. (Zhang P, Yu L T, Xiong Z K. Optimal contract design in closed-loop supply chain with asymmetric information under government rewards and punishment. China Management Science, 2020, 28(5):89-100.)
[23] 张夏然, 王自然, 蓝传晓, 等. 供应商资金约束下考虑政府补贴的供应链绿色生产决策研究. 管理学报, 2022, 19(2):280-288. (Zhang X R, Wang Z R, Lan C X, et al. Research on supply chain green production decisionmaking considering government subsidies under supplier funding constraints. Journal of Management, 2022, 19(2):280-288.)
[24] Elliot B, Karen D, Kenneth L. Behavior in operations management:Assessing recent findings and revisiting old assumptions. Journal of Operations Management, 2006, 24(6):737-752.
[25] 马德青, 胡劲松. 零售商具相对公平的闭环供应链随机微分博弈模型. 管理学报, 2018, 15(3):467-474. (Ma D Q, Hu J S. Retailers have a relatively fair closed-loop supply chain stochastic differential game model. Journal of Management, 2018, 15(3):467-474.)
[26] 韩同银, 刘丽, 金浩. 考虑政府补贴和公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链决策研究. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(4):194-204. (Han T Y, Liu L, Jin H. Research on decision-making of dual-channel green supply chain considering government subsidies and fairness concerns. China Management Science, 2022, 30(4):194-204.)
[27] Shi K, Jiang F, Ouyang Q. Altruism and pricing strategy in dual channel supply chains. American Journal of Operations Research, 2013, 3(4):402-412.
[28] Bassi M, Pagnozzi M, Piccolo S. Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity. Research in Economics, 2014, 68(1):27-38.
[29] 占永志, 陈金龙, 邹小红. 基于互惠动机的平台型供应链金融利益权衡机制. 系统科学学报, 2018, 26(2):131-136. (Zhan Y Z, Chen J L, Zou X H. Platform-type supply chain financial benefit balancing mechanism based on reciprocal motivation. Journal of Systems Science, 2018, 26(2):131-136.)
[30] 曾婷婷, 李登峰, 郑小雪. 考虑互惠偏好的闭环供应链合作机制研究. 系统科学与数学, 2020, 40(1):41-62. (Zeng T T, Li D F, Zheng X X. Research on closed-loop supply chain cooperation mechanism considering reciprocal preference. Systems Science and Mathematics, 2020, 40(1):41-62.)
[31] 丁军飞, 陈伟达, 付帅帅. 规模不经济下互惠偏好对闭环供应链的影响研究. 管理工程学报, 2022, 36(1):194-204. (Ding J F, Chen W D, Fu S S. Research on the impact of reciprocal preference on closed-loop supply chain under diseconomies of scale. Journal of Management Engineering, 2022, 36(1):194-204)
[32] Xia L, Guo T, Qin J, et al. Carbon emission reduction and pricing policies of a supply chain considering reciprocal preferences in cap-and-trade system. Annals of Operations Research, 2018, 268(1):149-175.
[33] 兰龙辉, 郑小雪, 李登峰. 考虑互惠偏好的闭环供应链合作博弈模型. 计算机集成制造系统, 2020, 272(12):3458-3470. (Lan L H, Zheng X X, Li D F. Closed-loop supply chain cooperation game model considering reciprocal preference. Computer Integrated Manufacturing System, 2020, 272(12):3458-3470.)
[34] 张克勇, 张娜. 政府补贴下具互惠偏好的绿色供应链定价与协调. 山东大学学报(理学版), 2022, 57(1):30-41, 49. (Zhang K Y, Zhang N. Pricing and coordination of green supply chain with mutual preference under government subsidies. Journal of Shandong University (Science Edition), 2022, 57(1):30- 41, 49.)
PDF(817 KB)

326

Accesses

0

Citation

Detail

Sections
Recommended

/