The Proportional Split-Off Solution for Cooperative Games and Application in Regional Economic Integration

ZHANG Guang, HE Nan

Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (4) : 791-801.

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Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (4) : 791-801. DOI: 10.12341/jssms20548T

The Proportional Split-Off Solution for Cooperative Games and Application in Regional Economic Integration

  • ZHANG Guang, HE Nan
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Abstract

This paper studies cooperative games and provides a new solution concept called proportional split-off solution based on proportional rule and the forming procedure for a coalition. By applying a given weighted vector and based on decrease of profits, a suitable distributed partition of the grand coalition is obtained. And then, depending on coalitions’ ordering in partition, the marginal contribution of the coalitions is determined by using proportional rule. Later on, three axiomatizations of the proportional split-off solution are proposed by adopting consistency. Finally, application of the new solution is studied on the regional economic situation. By building a synergy game, we analyze the contributions and program of the regional economic synergistic development in Yangtze River Delta.

Key words

Cooperative game / proportional split-off solution / axiomatization / regional economic

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ZHANG Guang , HE Nan. The Proportional Split-Off Solution for Cooperative Games and Application in Regional Economic Integration. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2022, 42(4): 791-801 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms20548T

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