对带有拥塞调控阈值的流体可修排队模型展开经济学分析. 拥塞调控阈值是系统用于调节流体到达率, 从而有效地缓解排队拥堵现象的标准. 系统状态不稳定, 一旦出现故障就停止服务进入维修状态, 维修状态下仍然允许顾客进入. 新到达的顾客为了使自身收益最大化, 有权利选择进入和止步. 通过构建指数形式的效用函数, 研究完全可见情形下顾客的止步行为, 得到了纳什均衡策略和单位时间内平均社会收益函数. 最后利用Matlab进行数值仿真分析, 研究拥塞调控阈值和顾客止步阈值对社会收益的影响.

This paper considers the customers' equilibrium behaviour and socially optimal threshold strategy for a congestion control fluid queue with an unreliable server. The congestion control fluid queue in this paper means that the input process is affected by the current value of the buffer content. The server is unreliable and has an exponentially distributed lifetime. Once the breakdown occurs, the server stops working completely until it is repaired. Customers have the right to decide whether to join or to balk according to the information of the system based on an exponential utility structure. Accordingly, the Nash equilibrium strategy and socially optimal threshold strategy are presented. In addition, the effect of system parameters on social benefit is illustrated by some numerical examples.