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随机需求下考虑公平偏好的合作广告协调模型

代建生,李春玲   

  1. 燕山大学经济管理学院, 秦皇岛 066004
  • 收稿日期:2021-08-02 修回日期:2022-10-09 出版日期:2023-02-25 发布日期:2023-03-16
  • 通讯作者: 代建生,Email:jiansheng.dai@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    河北省自然科学基金资助项目(G2022203005),国家自然科学基金资助项目(71762021),河北省软科学研究专项(205576103D)资助课题.

代建生,李春玲. 随机需求下考虑公平偏好的合作广告协调模型[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2023, 43(2): 323-341.

DAI Jiansheng, LI Chunling. Coordination of Vertical Cooperative Advertising Under Fairness Preference and Stochastic Demand[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2023, 43(2): 323-341.

Coordination of Vertical Cooperative Advertising Under Fairness Preference and Stochastic Demand

DAI Jiansheng, LI Chunling   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinghuangdao 066004
  • Received:2021-08-02 Revised:2022-10-09 Online:2023-02-25 Published:2023-03-16
在随机需求下,运用Fehr和Schmidt提出的公平偏好理论模型探讨了供应链合作广告协调问题,其中零售商具有利己和利他公平偏好.在批发价格契约下分析了零售商的公平偏好对订购和广告策略及渠道协调的影响,结果表明:除了一个测度为零的空间之外,批发价格契约不能协调供应链.设计了能协调供应链的收益共享和广告成本分担契约,并刻画了要完成渠道协调,契约参数须满足的充要条件.研究表明:1)在零售商具有利己公平偏好下,收益共享契约虽能协调供应链,但不能实现渠道收益的任意分配;2)若零售商的利他公平偏好较强,则能协调供应链(实现供应链期望利润最大化)的契约未必是帕累托最优契约,能实现公平分配的协调契约才是最优契约;3)在渠道协调下,零售商的利己和利他公平偏好对其效用均有负面影响.最后利用数值分析验证了相关结论.
This paper explores, in virtue of utility model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt, coordination of cooperative advertising of a supply chain where its retailer has self-interest and altruistic fairness preference, on as-sumption the demand is stochastic. It analyzes impact of the self-interest and altruistic fairness preference on the inventory and advertising strategy and supply chain coordination under wholesales price contract, and shows that wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, except for a space with probability measure equal to zero. It designs revenue sharing contract combined with cost sharing mechanism, and characterizes a sufficient and necessary condition satisfied by the parameters of contract that can succeed in achieving coordination. The conclusions are obtained as follows. (i) The revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, but it can’t realize arbitrary split of channel profit, if the retailer has self-interest fairness preference. (ii) If the retailer’s altruistic fairness preference degree exceeds a certain threshold, the contracts that can coordinate the supply chain (to achieve maximization of the supply chain expected profit) may not be optimal. In particular, there exists an optimal contract under which the welfare statuses of the two firms are better than that under other coordination contracts. (iii) Either self-interest or altruistic fairness preference imposes a negative impact on the retailer’s utility level, in the case of channel coordination. Lastly, a numerical analysis is used to verity the conclusions.

MR(2010)主题分类: 

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