This paper explores, in virtue of utility model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt, coordination of cooperative advertising of a supply chain where its retailer has self-interest and altruistic fairness preference, on as-sumption the demand is stochastic. It analyzes impact of the self-interest and altruistic fairness preference on the inventory and advertising strategy and supply chain coordination under wholesales price contract, and shows that wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, except for a space with probability measure equal to zero. It designs revenue sharing contract combined with cost sharing mechanism, and characterizes a sufficient and necessary condition satisfied by the parameters of contract that can succeed in achieving coordination. The conclusions are obtained as follows. (i) The revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, but it can’t realize arbitrary split of channel profit, if the retailer has self-interest fairness preference. (ii) If the retailer’s altruistic fairness preference degree exceeds a certain threshold, the contracts that can coordinate the supply chain (to achieve maximization of the supply chain expected profit) may not be optimal. In particular, there exists an optimal contract under which the welfare statuses of the two firms are better than that under other coordination contracts. (iii) Either self-interest or altruistic fairness preference imposes a negative impact on the retailer’s utility level, in the case of channel coordination. Lastly, a numerical analysis is used to verity the conclusions.