有限理性下征地拆迁补偿组合性博弈均衡评价

赵旭,洪开荣,孙倩

系统科学与数学 ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (8) : 1236-1252.

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系统科学与数学 ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (8) : 1236-1252. DOI: 10.12341/jssms13690
论文

有限理性下征地拆迁补偿组合性博弈均衡评价

    赵旭1,2,洪开荣1,孙倩2
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Combinatorial Game Equilibrium Evaluation on Compensation for Land Acquisition Under Bounded Rationality

    ZHAO Xu 1,2 ,HONG Kairong 1, SUN Qian2
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摘要

征地拆迁补偿策略选择是多主体、多策略、多偏好的组合性博弈均衡结果, 引入决策理论方法构建组合性博弈均衡评价模型将组合性博弈均衡求解问题转化为均衡评价问题, 有助于降低复杂的组合性博弈均衡求解难度.有限理性下, 自利动机的基础性寻利偏好常常需与其他行为偏好集合才能完整充分表现, 构建寻利、损失规避和互动公平偏好下地方政府、村集体经济组织和被征地农民的三主体多策略博弈模型, 并进行均衡评价和算例分析.研究表明组合性均衡评价方法对求解多主体、多策略、多偏好的组合性博弈均衡是有效的;集合考虑主体寻利、损失规避和互动公平偏好能有效实现征地拆迁补偿(公平价格征收, 接受, 接受)的合意均衡.要推动和谐 征收, 征地拆迁补偿一定要考虑多重行为偏好对主体得益的影响, 征收人要强化互动公 平偏好, 发挥``公平价格征收''的积极强化作用.

Abstract

The compensation strategy for land expropriation is the equilibrium result of combinational game for multi-subject, multi-strategy and multi-preference. The introduction of evaluation theory to construct the model of combinatorial equilibrium decision theory, in which the combinatorial game equilibrium problem has been transformed into the equilibrium evaluation problem, is helpful to reduce the difficulty to solve the complex combinatorial game equilibrium. Under the bounded rationality, the basic profit-seeking preference arisen from self-profit motivation could be fully manifested only with exposing to other behavior preference clusters. This paper constructs the three-subject multi-strategy game model consisting of local government, village collective economic organization and expropriated peasants under profit seeking, loss avoidance and interactive equity preference, and carries on the equilibrium evaluation and example analysis. The results show that: The combinatorial equilibrium evaluation method is effective for solving the combinatorial game equilibrium for multi-subject, multi-strategy and multi-preference. When considering the subject seeking profit, loss avoidance and interactive equity preferences, the integration can effectively realize the consensual equilibrium of land requisition compensation (fair price collection, acceptance and acceptance). In order to better promote the harmonious collection, the compensation for land acquisition must consider the influence of multiple behavior preference on the benefit of the subject, the levy should strengthen the interactive fair preference and the positive strengthening effect of ``fair price collection".

关键词

有限理性 /   / 征地拆迁补偿 /   / 组合性博弈 /   / 均衡评价.

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赵旭 , 洪开荣 , 孙倩. 有限理性下征地拆迁补偿组合性博弈均衡评价. 系统科学与数学, 2019, 39(8): 1236-1252. https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms13690
ZHAO Xu , HONG Kairong , SUN Qian. Combinatorial Game Equilibrium Evaluation on Compensation for Land Acquisition Under Bounded Rationality. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2019, 39(8): 1236-1252 https://doi.org/10.12341/jssms13690
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