以社会福利最大化为目标, 建立双寡头垄断下医疗机构质量价格序贯博弈模型, 以及在医疗服务价格和财政补偿双重规制下的政府和医疗机构之间的两阶段博弈模型. 研究发现: 由于医疗服务市场价格竞争削弱了质量竞争效应, 序贯博弈的纳什均衡质量低于以社会福利最大化为目标的社会均衡质量. 当医疗机构的固定成本控制在某个范围时, 政府双重规制下的均衡质量优于医疗机构质量价格序贯博弈下的均衡质量, 从而从理论上证明了政府双重规制的有效性.

Medical service market is different from other markets where market-based solutions are often proposed to improve quality. This paper analyzes whether it is free competition or government regulation in the medical service market to improve the quality. Based on social welfare maximization as the goal, this paper establishes quality price sequential game model under a duopoly medical service market, and two-phase game model between the government and medical institutions under the dual regulation of price and financial compensation. The Nash equilibrium quality of sequential game is lower than the social balance quality because price competition weakens the quality competition effect. If fixed cost in quality investment is controlled in certain range, the quality under the dual regulation in price and financial compensation is better than the quality under the sequential game. So it proves that the government's dual regulation in price and financial compensation is effective.