考虑消费者偏好的绿色供应链补贴绩效研究

doi:10.12341/jssms21459T

系统科学与数学 ›› 2022, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (4): 818-831.DOI: 10.12341/jssms21459T

考虑消费者偏好的绿色供应链补贴绩效研究

于晓辉^1,2, 张志强¹, 于亚南¹

1. 北京物资学院物流学院北京 101149;
2. 北京物资学院双碳研究院北京 101149

收稿日期:2021-08-23 修回日期:2022-01-16 出版日期:2022-04-25 发布日期:2022-06-18
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金(72171024,71801016,72074002)资助课题.

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于晓辉, 张志强, 于亚南. 考虑消费者偏好的绿色供应链补贴绩效研究[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2022, 42(4): 818-831.

YU Xiaohui, ZHANG Zhiqiang, YU Yanan. Research on Subsidy Performance of Green Supply Chain Considering Consumer Preference[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2022, 42(4): 818-831.

Research on Subsidy Performance of Green Supply Chain Considering Consumer Preference

YU Xiaohui^1,2, ZHANG Zhiqiang¹, YU Yanan¹

1. School of Logistics, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149;
2. Institute for Carbon Peak and Neutrality, Beijing 101149

Received:2021-08-23 Revised:2022-01-16 Online:2022-04-25 Published:2022-06-18

关键词： 绿色, 供应链, 补贴, 博弈

In order to improve the green supply chain performance, the government gives retailers green product subsidies, and manufacturers give retailers green promotion subsidies. Based on the Stackelberg game analysis of the secondary supply chain composed of manufacturers and retailers, we explore the impact of green product subsidies and green promotion subsidies on the supply chain performance considering consumers’ green preference. It is found that subsidies have a positive effect on product greenness and profit. When consumer preference is not high or product greenness coefficient is low, green product subsidies are more suitable; When consumers have high preference or green promotion efficiency, green promotion subsidies are more suitable. As an external subsidy of the supply chain, the regulation ability of green product subsidy is limited; As an internal subsidy of supply chain, green promotion subsidy can produce higher performance.

Key words: Green, supply chain, subsidy, game theory

MR(2010)主题分类:

91B06

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