• • 上一篇    下一篇

基于前景理论的园区环境污染第三方治理机会主义行为防治研究

黄仁辉1,2, 高明1,2   

  1. 1. 福州大学经济与管理学院, 福州 350116;
    2. 福州大学福建绿色发展研究院, 福州 350116
  • 收稿日期:2021-09-01 修回日期:2022-01-17 出版日期:2022-06-25 发布日期:2022-07-29
  • 通讯作者: 高明,Email:gaoming65@163.com.
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL176),福建省科技计划项目(2021R0015)资助课题.

黄仁辉, 高明. 基于前景理论的园区环境污染第三方治理机会主义行为防治研究[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2022, 42(6): 1580-1595.

HUANG Renhui, GAO Ming. Research on the Prevention and Control of Opportunistic Behaviors of the Third Party Governance of Environmental Pollution in Parks Based on Prospect Theory[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2022, 42(6): 1580-1595.

Research on the Prevention and Control of Opportunistic Behaviors of the Third Party Governance of Environmental Pollution in Parks Based on Prospect Theory

HUANG Renhui1,2, GAO Ming1,2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116;
    2. Fujian Green Development Institute, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116
  • Received:2021-09-01 Revised:2022-01-17 Online:2022-06-25 Published:2022-07-29
园区环境污染第三方治理模式中治理企业存在的机会主义行为严重影响治污成效,政府如何采取有效监管策略来区分及规制市场中不同技术水平的第三方治理企业是当前的重点问题.文章基于前景理论构建出政府与治理企业间的信号博弈模型,通过比较不同的均衡结果探究了甄别不同技术水平治理企业的实现条件,并借助数值模拟探讨了相关参数的作用程度.研究发现:政府通过设置合理补贴区间与调节伪装成本可对不同层次的第三方治理企业进行有效区分;随技术水平高的第三方治理企业所占市场份额增大,政府补贴力度要相应提升,并需同步提高伪装成本;决策主体受风险态度参数影响较大,需尽力稳定主体的风险偏好.最后,针对相应结论给出政府监管策略建议.
The opportunistic behavior of governance companies in the third-party governance model of environmental pollution in the park seriously affects the effectiveness of pollution control. What effective regulatory strategy the government adopts to distinguish and regulate third-party governance companies with different technical levels in the market is the current key issue. Based on the prospect theory, this paper constructs a signal game model between the government and the governance enterprise. By comparing the different equilibrium results, it explores the realization conditions of identifying the governance enterprises of different technical levels, and explores the effect of related parameters with the help of numerical simulation. The results show that the government can promote the realization of separation equilibrium by setting a reasonable subsidy interval and adjusting the cost of disguise, so that the third-party governance enterprises of different levels can be effectively distinguished. With the market share of the high technical level third-party governance enterprises increases, the government subsidies need to be increased accordingly, and the cost of disguise needs to be increased simultaneously. Decision-making entities are greatly affected by risk attitude parameters, and it's necessary to stabilize the entity's risk appetite. Finally, the government supervision strategy recommendations are given to the corresponding conclusions.

MR(2010)主题分类: 

()
[1] 赵禹程,程文浩,俞乔.构建国家发展综合平台及高质量发展评价指标体系——以经开区、高新区和国家级新区为例.科学管理研究, 2020, 38(5):2-11.(Zhao Y C, Cheng W H, Yu Q.Establishment of a high-quality development evaluation index system for the national comprehensive development-Take economic development zone, hightech zone and national new zone as examples.Scientific Management Research, 2020, 38(5):2-11.)
[2] 商务部.2021年1-9月国家级经济技术开发区主要经济指标情况.http://ezone.mofcom.gov.cn/article/m/202201/20220103235257.shtml.
[3] 国家发展和改革委员会.关于深入推进园区环境污染第三方治理的通知.https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/201907/t20190719962486.html.
[4] 财政部税务总局国家发展改革委生态环境部.关于从事污染防治的第三方企业所得税政策问题的公告.http://szs.mof.gov.cn/zhengcefabu/201904/t201904253234504.html.
[5] 牛耘诗,褚晓凌,王守清,等.PPP项目提前终止下社会资本机会主义行为研究.系统工程理论与实践, 2019, 39(11):2784-2791.(Niu Y S, Chu X L, Wang S Q, et al.Analysis of opportunistic behaviors of the private partner facing early termination in PPP projects.Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice, 2019, 39(11):2784-2791.)
[6] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P.Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives.Econometrica, 1987, 55(2):303-328.
[7] 王文宾,赵学娟,张鹏,等.双重信息不对称下闭环供应链的激励机制研究.中国管理科学, 2016, 24(10):69-77.(Wang W B, Zhao X J, Zhang P, et al.Incentive mechanism of closed-loop supply chain under double information asymmetry.Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(10):69-77.)
[8] 陈晓红,余章美,李金霖,等.不对称信息下企业污染治理外包的最优契约设计.系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(2):273-283.(Chen X H, Yu Z M, Li J L, et al.Design contracts for corporate pollution abatement service under asymmetric information.Systems Engineering-Theory&Practice, 2020, 40(2):273-283)
[9] 赵昌平,葛卫华.战略联盟中的机会主义及其防御策略.科学学与科学技术管理, 2003,(10):114-117.(Zhao C P, Ge W H.Opportunism and its defense strategy in strategic alliances.Science of Science and Management of S.&T., 2003,(10):114-117.)
[10] 武开,张慧颖.委托代理关系下监督强度与激励机制设计.系统工程, 2016, 34(7):68-72.(Wu K, Zhang H Y.Supervisary intensity and incentive mechanism based on the principal-agency relationship.Systems Engineering, 2016, 34(7):68-72.)
[11] 李一丁.第三方治理二次环境污染责任的认定——企业环境信用评价法制化视角的分析.中国地质大学学报(社会科学版), 2019, 19(2):35-44.(Li Y D.Determination of the third party's responsibility for controlling secondary environmental pollution-An analysis from the perspective of legalization of enterprise s'environmental credit evaluation.Journal of China University of Geosciences (Social Sciences Edition), 2019, 19(2):35-44.)
[12] 彭璞.环境污染第三方治理模式下法律责任承担问题研究.环境与可持续发展, 2019, 44(4):94-99.(Peng P.Study on legal liability assumption under the third-party environmental pollution control model.Environment and Sustainable Development, 2019, 44(4):94-99.)
[13] 唐绍均,魏雨.环境污染第三方治理中的刑事责任界定.南通大学学报(社会科学版), 2020, 36(4):90-97.(Tang S J, Wei Y.On the definition of criminal liability in the third-party governance of environmental pollution.Journal of Nantong University (Social Science Edition), 2020, 36(4):90-97.)
[14] 张维迎.经济学原理.上海:上海人民出版社, 2004.(Zhang W Y.Principles of Economics.Shanghai:Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2004.)
[15] 高明,郭施宏,夏玲玲.大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定——基于演化博弈分析.中国管理科学, 2016, 24(8):62-70.(Gao M, Guo S H, Xia L L.Analysis on the formation and stability of cooperative management alliance of air pollution control among local governments:Based on the evolutionary game.Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(8):62-70.)
[16] 焦建玲,陈洁,李兰兰,等.碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析.中国管理科学, 2017, 25(10):140-150.(Jiao J L, Chen J, Li L L, et al.A study of local governments'and enterprises'actions in the carbon emission mechanism of subsidy or punishment based on the evolutionary game.Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(10):140-150.)
[17] Liu G F, Xu Y, Tian T T, et al.The impacts of China's fund policy on waste electrical and electronic equipment utilization.Journal of Cleaner Production, 2020, 251, DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119582.
[18] 陈真玲,王文举.环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析.管理评论, 2017, 29(5):226-236.(Chen Z L, Wang W J.Evolutionary game analysis of government and polluting firms considering environmental tax regulation.Management Review, 2017, 29(5):226-236.)
[19] 毕然.海绵城市PPP项目中政府与企业的博弈分析.工业技术经济, 2020, 39(5):144-151.(Bi R.Game analysis of the government and enterprises in PPP project of sponge city.Industrial Technology&Economy, 2020, 39(5):144-151.)
[20] 张国兴,张绪涛,程素杰,等.节能减排补贴政策下的企业与政府信号博弈模型.中国管理科学, 2013, 21(4):129-136.(Zhang G X, Zhang X T, Cheng S J, et al.Signal game model of government and enterprises based on the subsidy policy of energy saving and emission reduction.Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2013, 21(4):129-136.)
[21] 李德荃,曹文,曹原,等.关于节能减排达标申报制度的信号博弈分析.中国人口·资源与环境, 2016, 26(12):108-116.(Li D Q, Cao W, Cao Y, et al.Signal game analysis on standard declaration system of energy conservation and emission reduction.China Population · Resources and Environment, 2016, 26(12):108-116.)
[22] Fu J, Zhong J, Chen D M, et al.Urban environmental governance, government intervention, and optimal strategies:A perspective on electronic waste management in China.Resources, Conservation&Recycling, 2020, 154, DOI:10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.104547.
[23] Sward A, Lunnan R.Trust and control in fixed duration alliances.International Journal of Strategic Business Alliances, 2011, 2(1/2):41-68.
[24] Payne J W, Laughhunn D J, Crum R.Multiattribute risky choice behavior:The editing of complex prospects.Management Science, 1984, 30(11):1350-1361.
[25] Tversky K A.Prospect theory:An analysis of decision under risk.Econometrica, 1979, 47(2):263-291.
[26] 杨军.财务杠杆、信号博弈与信用风险识别.金融研究, 2004,(2):71-78.(Yang J.Financial leverage, signaling game and credit risk recognition.Journal of Financial Research, 2004,(2):71-78.)
[27] 胡震云,陈晨,王慧敏,等.水污染治理的微分博弈及策略研究.中国人口·资源与环境, 2014, 24(5):93-101.(Hu Z Y, Chen C, Wang H M, et al.Study on the differential game and strategy of water pollution control.China Population, Resources and Environment, 2014, 24(5):93-101.)
[28] 陈晓红,余章美,李金霖.考虑风险偏好的污染治理外包合同设计.控制与决策, 2019, 34(12):2690-2697.(Chen X H, Yu Z M, Li J L.Outsourcing contract for pollution abatement service with risk preference consideration.Control and Decision, 2019, 34(12):2690-2697.)
[29] Nagarajan M, Shechter S.Prospect theory and the newsvendor problem.Management Science, 2014, 60(4):1057-1062.
[1] 潘晓宏, 王应明. 区间二型模糊前景理论方法及其在多属性决策中的应用[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2021, 41(6): 1533-1547.
[2] 李美娟, 卢锦呈, 蔡猷花. 基于前景理论的毕达哥拉斯模糊有序加权距离TOPSIS法[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2021, 41(5): 1291-1304.
[3] 马艳芳, 赵媛媛, 冯翠英, 李宗敏. 多粒度概率语言TODIM方法在垃圾回收APP评价中的应用[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2021, 41(12): 3530-3547.
[4] 肖汉强,赵扬. 考虑主体心理行为的一对多双边匹配决策方法[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2020, 40(11): 2071-2081.
[5] 王宗润,吴丝晴. 基于感知收益-风险比分析的结构性产品投资决策[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2019, 39(7): 1098-1116.
[6] 田丽君,吕成锐,黄海军. 基于出行时间区间数和参考点的择路行为研究[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2018, 38(4): 395-405.
[7] 张亚杰,王应明,陈圣群. 基于前景理论和证据推理的双边匹配决策方法[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2017, 37(3): 768-780.
[8] 王霞. 基于灰色前景关联的多属性决策模型[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2017, 37(3): 810-818.
[9] 陈振颂,李延来,CHEN Kwai-Sang. 基于二型直觉三角前景T2ITFNHA算子的多准则群决策方法[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2016, 36(8): 1226-1254.
[10] 郑晶,王应明,蓝以信. 考虑决策者心理行为的多时期应急决策方法[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2015, 35(5): 545-555.
[11] 乐琦. 基于累积前景理论的具有不确定偏好序信息的双边匹配决策方法[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2013, 33(9): 1061-1070.
[12] 乐琦. 基于前景理论的相同无差异区间型多指标匹配决策方法[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2013, 33(12): 1447-1455.
阅读次数
全文


摘要