丁晶晶, 杨君彦, 胡丹, 梁樑
丁晶晶, 杨君彦, 胡丹, 梁樑. 信息不对称下的高校预算绩效管理系统研究[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2022, 42(5): 1246-1260.
DING Jingjing, YANG Junyan, HU Dan, LIANG Liang. Research on Performance based Budgeting Management System for High Educational Institutions under Information Asymmetry[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2022, 42(5): 1246-1260.
DING Jingjing, YANG Junyan, HU Dan, LIANG Liang
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