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信息不对称下的高校预算绩效管理系统研究

丁晶晶, 杨君彦, 胡丹, 梁樑   

  1. 合肥工业大学管理学院, 合肥 230009
  • 收稿日期:2020-09-16 修回日期:2022-01-18 出版日期:2022-05-25 发布日期:2022-07-23
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(71771074),国家自然科学基金基础科学中心项目(72188101)资助课题.

丁晶晶, 杨君彦, 胡丹, 梁樑. 信息不对称下的高校预算绩效管理系统研究[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2022, 42(5): 1246-1260.

DING Jingjing, YANG Junyan, HU Dan, LIANG Liang. Research on Performance based Budgeting Management System for High Educational Institutions under Information Asymmetry[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2022, 42(5): 1246-1260.

Research on Performance based Budgeting Management System for High Educational Institutions under Information Asymmetry

DING Jingjing, YANG Junyan, HU Dan, LIANG Liang   

  1. School of Managenment, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009
  • Received:2020-09-16 Revised:2022-01-18 Online:2022-05-25 Published:2022-07-23
文章针对高校管理者预算分配和绩效管理角色与教师预算执行角色间存在信息不对称与目标不一致问题背景,运用多任务多代理人委托代理模型和拍卖模型构建了信息不对称下的高校预算绩效管理模型.通过对模型的理论分析得到描述系统最优状态关系的数学表达式包括:1)教师科研和教学努力程度与激励系数的关系;2)系统的最优资源分配量;3)最优的固定工资水平和激励系数;4)资源的内部转移价格.最后,文章将模型应用到A高校研究生培养经费与教师工资和高校目标的预算绩效管理系统分析中.应用展示高校可以通过调整激励程度或产出目标影响教师可接受的最高助研费大小,使教师更乐于接受学校制定的助研费标准.文章构建的模型及发现可为高校完善预算绩效管理系统提供理论指导,以提升内部资源配置和办学效率.
Under the background of information asymmetry and conflict goals between high education institutions management (taking budget allocation and performance management role) and teachers (taking budget execution role), this paper applies multi-task and multi-agent principal-agent paradigm along with the auction model, to build a model of performance based budgeting management system for high education institutions. Through the theoretical analyses of the model, this paper obtains theoretical relationships among states of budgeting system. Key relationships include the teachers' behavior and incentive coefficients, optimal allocation of resources, optimal incentive setting for teachers and intra-resource transfer pricing. Finally, this paper applies the model to the analysis of the allocation of graduate training funds and teacher salary budgets in University A. University A invests training funds to recruit graduate students, allocates graduate students and designs teacher incentive mechanism for the teaching and research outputs to achieve performance goals. The application demonstrates that University A can optimally adjust its incentive system and output targets to alleviate the dispute on the graduate research assistant fee while achieving its goals. The results of this paper provide a theoretical guidance for high education institutions to improve the performance based budgeting system and the efficiency of resource allocation and school running.

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