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The General Compromise Value for Cooperative Games With Transferable Utility

SUN Panfei, HOU Dongshuang, SUN Hao   

  1. chool of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710101, China
  • Received:2021-05-16 Revised:2022-02-18 Online:2023-01-25 Published:2023-02-09
  • Supported by:
    This paper is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 72001172, 71871180 and 72071158, the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant No. 310201911qd052 and Natural Science Basic Research Plan in Shaanxi Province of China under Grant No. 2020JQ-225.

SUN Panfei, HOU Dongshuang, SUN Hao. The General Compromise Value for Cooperative Games With Transferable Utility[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 2023, 36(1): 375-392.

The authors introduce the general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility. With respect to a set of potential payoffs of which the maximal and minimal potential payoff vectors are regarded as the upper and lower bounds for players, the unique pre-imputation lying on the straight line segment with these two vectors as the extreme points is defined as the general compromise value. Potential-consistency and maximal proportional property are introduced to characterize the general compromise value.
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