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SUN Panfei, HOU Dongshuang, SUN Hao
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[1] | Fanyong MENG, Qiang ZHANG. COOPERATIVE GAMES ON CONVEX GEOMETRIES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE [J]. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 2012, 25(5): 909-925. |
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