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Inventory Games with Quantity Discount

  

  1. LI Wenzhong · XU Genjiu (Corresponding author)
    School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, China.
    Email: liwenzhong@mail.nwpu.edu.cn; xugenjiu@nwpu.edu.cn.
    SU Jun
    School of Science, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China.
    Email: junsu@126.com.
  • Online:2021-08-25 Published:2021-08-10

LI Wenzhong · XU Genjiu · SU Jun. Inventory Games with Quantity Discount[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 2021, 34(4): 1538-1554.

Meca, et al. (2004) studied a class of inventory games which arise when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common good decide to cooperate and make joint orders. In this paper, the authors extend their model to the situation where the manufacturer provides the retailers with a price discount on purchases in excess of a certain order quantity. The authors define the corresponding inventory game with quantity discount, and show that the inventory game has a nonempty core. Then, the authors propose a core allocation rule, the demand-proportionality rule, and characterize it by introducing efficiency, the retailer splitting property and continuity.
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